Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶21
That brings us to steps two and three in Enbridge's argument. The Attorney General argues that, at each step, En- bridge confronts an independent reason why § 1446(b)(1), though nonjurisdictional, is not subject to equitable tolling. First, she disagrees that any presumption of equitable tolling applies to § 1446(b)(1). This Court “ha[s] only applied [the presumption of equitable tolling] to statutes of limitations.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 13–14 (2014); see Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). According to the Attorney General, § 1446(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations because it does not “extinguis[h] a tardy claim (the function of a statute of limitations),” Arellano v. Mc- Donough, 598 U. S. 1, 7 (2023), and instead addresses “a forum issue that arises only after a claim for relief has been brought.” Brief for Respondent 28; see Young v. United…Read in context ›
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