Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶23

Starting with the text of § 1446(b)(1), this provision speaks in strict, mandatory terms. It requires that a notice of removal “shall be fled within 30 days” of the defendant receiving either a complaint or summons, “whichever period is shorter.” To be sure, this kind of mandatory language is not sufficient, on its own, to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. See, e. g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410–411, 420 (2015) (deadline stating that claim “ `shall be forever barred' ” was subject to equitable tolling). The strict phrasing of § 1446(b)(1), however, is at least consistent with treating its deadline as mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Cf. Boechler, 596 U. S., at 204, 211 (concluding that equitable tolling applied to a provision that merely set the deadline by which a person “ `may' ” file a petition with the Tax Court).

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