Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶24

More important, and decisive here, is § 1446(b)(1)'s structure. This Court has repeatedly held that an “explicit listing of exceptions,” set forth in a detailed manner, strongly indicates “that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, `equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote.” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352; see, e. g., Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. That is because “[i]t would be inconsistent with [a] comprehensive scheme” that includes a default deadline and several exceptions “to extend [the deadline] still further through the doctrine of equitable tolling,” outside of those specified exceptions. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. This “structural inference” is “heighten[ed],” moreover, if the “specific exceptions” at issue already “refect equitable considerations.” Id., at 9.

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