Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶29
Finally, and to “garnish an already solid argument,” “the nature of the subject matter” here underscores the unavailability of equitable tolling. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 14; see Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352. The federal civil removal statutes have an “obvious concern with efficiency,” BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 245 (2021), and a “general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits questions,” Powerex Corp. v. Re liant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 237 (2007). That is refected not only in the short deadline for removal itself, but also in the strict 30-day deadline for seeking remand of a removed action, § 1447(c), and the default rule that remand orders are not appealable, § 1447(d); see Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U. S. 633, 640–642 (2006) (explaining that this interest in efficiency and finality necessarily…Read in context ›
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