Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶33
On the text of § 1446(b)(1), Enbridge argues that the 30day deadline is short and focused on litigants' conduct, not courts' authority, which (according to Enbridge) makes it akin to other provisions the Court has held subject to equitable tolling. See, e. g., Boechler, 596 U. S., at 209. This Court, however, has found other deadlines that speak at least in part to a litigant's conduct, and with even shorter deadlines, not to be subject to equitable tolling when surrounding context led to that conclusion. See, e. g., Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 351, 354 (claim had to “ `be fled by the taxpayer' ” within certain periods); cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at 191, 194 (similar, with 14-day window).Read in context ›
preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.