Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶35

Nor does Enbridge's rejoinder account for the many other provisions, outside of § 1446, expressly allowing courts to toll § 1446(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline “for cause shown” and the like. See supra, at 79. Enbridge labels these as “comprehensive legislation targeting a particular area for reform,” not “exception[s] to Section 1446(b).” Reply Brief 16–17; see id., at 16–20. The problem is that, in the most important respect, these statutes are not “comprehensive”: They do not set their own deadlines, but rely on § 1446(b)(1) and modify it. Critically, they often do so precisely to allow consideration of the very same equitable factors that, on Enbridge's theory, are already built into § 1446(b)(1). Enbridge also suggests that because these exceptions are located outside of § 1446 itself, they should carry less force. The Court, however, has already disapproved of such “[l]aser focu[s]” on a…

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