Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel · ¶37

Finally, Enbridge points to § 1447(c)'s 30-day deadline for motions to remand, which does not apply if a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. As Enbridge sees it, Congress's requirement of remand even outside of the 30-day deadline for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not for other defects like untimeliness, suggests that Congress intended to treat untimeliness less harshly than the lack of jurisdiction, including by allowing equitable tolling. Enbridge's conclusion does not follow from its premises. Section 1447(c) refects the unique stringency that applies to jurisdictional rules, which “cannot be waived or forfeited.” Boechler, 596 U. S., at 203; cf. Nutraceutical, 586 U. S., at 192 (explaining that even “mandatory” rules not subject to equitable tolling may be “subject to waiver and forfeiture”). As explained above, however, not all nonjurisdictional rules can be…

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