Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton · ¶17

Coney Island, several Courts of Appeals, and a prominent treatise nonetheless maintain that Rule 60(c)(1)'s reasonable- time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness. See n. 1, supra; 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862, pp. 431–433 (3d ed. 2012). These authorities acknowledge that their interpretation clashes with Rule 60's text. See, e. g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ce ramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F. 3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998). But relying on the generally accepted maxim that a “void judgment is a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260, 270 (2010), they argue that the passage of time cannot turn such a nullity into an enforceable judgment. See, e. g., Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343 (CADC 1962).

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