Rutherford v. United States · ¶111
In any event, even assuming Congress intended to impose a rigid, two-step process, it is hard to “see how a court may be thought to subvert congressional intent by considering nonretroactive changes to the law at the `extraordinary and compelling' stage of the analysis but not while weighing the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F. 4th 14, 32 (CA1 2022) (Barron, J., concurring). “[I]f Congress truly intended to bar district courts from considering [the First Step Act's] changes to mandatory minimums in the compassionate release context by making the changes non- retroactive, then it is doubtful those changes should be considered at all.” United States v. Chen, 48 F. 4th 1092, 1099 (CA9 2022). It also remains that, no matter how the Court may try to slice it, a compassionate-release proceeding is a “sentence-modification proceeding,” and courts have long enjoyed broad…Read in context ›
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