Rutherford v. United States · ¶40

While the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” leave room for judgment, they are not so fexible as to encompass any consideration. Their meaning depends on context: A reason is “extraordinary” and “compelling” only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to “warrant” compassionate release. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see Fernandez v. United States, 608 U. S. 411, 423–424, and n. 4 (2026). As we have explained, the disparity resulting from Congress's amendment to § 924(c) tracks ordinary sentencing practice and refects Congress's deliberate choice to extend relief to some prisoners and not others. Thus, the disparity is neither an “extraordinary” nor a “compelling” reason that warrants a reduction in sentence.

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