Rutherford v. United States · ¶42
This argument fares no better. We have repeatedly emphasized that “ `[t]he force of any negative implication . . . depends on context.' ” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (quoting Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 381 (2013)); see also A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107–111 (2012). A speaker's choice to rule out one item does not always mean that the rest of the universe is on the table. Imagine that a dietitian cautions her patient, “Pasta alone is not an acceptable dinner.” Though the patient might fervently wish otherwise, this advice does not license any meal besides standalone pasta. (Fried chicken with a side of funnel cakes? A bowl of Lucky Charms?) Instead, the dietitian surely had some reason—like the patient's past eating habits—to caution against this specific choice.Read in context ›
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