Rutherford v. United States · ¶43

So too with § 994(t). By addressing rehabilitation, Congress did not impliedly bless all other considerations. Instead, it had a particular reason—namely, past sentencing practice—to single out this factor. Before the Sentencing Reform Act, “[b]oth indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to society.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363 (1989). Guided by this aim, the judge and parole officer each made decisions based on “their own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation.” Ibid. When the Sentencing Reform Act eliminated parole and instituted a new sentencing regime, it “reject[ed] imprisonment as a means of promoting…

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