Rutherford v. United States · ¶48

The implications of this argument are sweeping. Indeed, its logic extends well beyond nonretroactive sentencing amendments to disagreement with the length of any punishment on the books. Take a judge who believes that a mandatory minimum is unduly harsh. Could she treat the severity of the sentence as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release? Petitioners refused to rule out this possibility at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11–15, 44–49. Yet “[i]t is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820). Treating the severity of a mandatory penalty as a reason for compassionate release rejects Congress's judgment that the punishment fts the crime.And petitioners' proposal—injecting other factors into the mix of extraordinary and compelling reasons—does not solve the problem.…

preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.