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Rutherford v. United States · ¶85

Given the difficulty in defning with precision what makes something “unusual,” this Court has held, in the sentencing context, that such determinations fall within district courts' discretion. In Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996), the Court noted that a district court's finding that a factor at sentencing was “unusual or exceptional,” such that a departure from the then-binding Sentencing Guidelines was warranted, “embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.” Id., at 98. That was because such a judgment refected the district court's “ `special competence' ” in evaluating “ `the fact-specific circumstances of the case' ” that set it apart from others. Id., at 99. Similarly, when identifying cases that are “ `exceptional,' ” the Court has explained that the inquiry must be carried out by “[d]istrict courts . . . in the case-by-case exercise of their…
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