Rutherford v. United States · ¶92

In light of this centuries-old tradition, if Congress wishes to restrict what courts may consider at sentence-modification proceedings, it must say so expressly. “The only limitations on a court's discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” Id., at 494. (All agree that the Constitution does not expressly bar consideration of nonretroactive changes in law.) When Congress is silent, this Court infers that Congress did not intend to limit sentencing courts' discretion because “Congress is not shy about placing such limits where it deems them appropriate” and has “ `shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.' ” Id., at 494, 497 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 103 (2007)).

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