Rutherford v. United States · ¶94

Congress's words here do not limit courts' discretion as to what they may consider. As explained, the words “extraordinary and compelling” do not foreclose the approach the Commission adopted in § 1B1.13(b)(6). Congress's delegation to the Commission, moreover, contained just one express restriction: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(t). That restriction, however, does not bar courts from considering rehabilitation in conjunction with other facts and evidence. Nor does it bar the Commission from allowing courts to consider evidence of rehabilitation alongside other facts, as the Commission has done. See USSG § 1B1.13(d). That specific restriction thus poses no limit on what evidence courts may consider, and in fact confirms that Congress knows how to limit compassionate-release practices explicitly…

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