Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe · ¶35
This understates the point. While our cases at one time permitted courts to provide redress if Congress remained silent, see, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964), “we have since rejected the practice of fashioning rights of action as we see fit,” FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ＿＿＿, ＿＿＿–＿＿＿ (2026) (slip op., at 3–4). That is so because “[h]ome-grown causes of action are difficult to reconcile with ‘the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power.’” Id., at ＿＿＿ (slip op., at 4) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 491 (2022)); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 133 (2017). Congress is better positioned than courts to evaluate the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. See Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 638–639 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). This is especially true in an area like this one, where the Constitution…Read in context ›
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