Hamm v. Smith · ¶127

Before Atkins, a defendant convicted of a capital offense could argue at the sentencing phase of his trial that the death penalty should not be imposed because his “mental retardation”—a condition that psychologists now term “intellectual disability”—diminished his culpability. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U. S. 825, 827–828 (2009). Specifically, under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989), a defendant could argue that his disability rendered him “less able than a normal adult” to “act `deliberately,' ” “control his impulses,” or “evaluate the consequences of his conduct.” Id., at 322–328. Applying this regime, Virginia sentenced Daryl Atkins to death after he unsuccessfully attempted to mitigate his culpability using evidence of intellectual disability.

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