Hamm v. Smith · ¶91
The next two decisions further walked back Atkins's promise to allow States to define mental retardation and instead outsourced the project to clinical practice. In Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017) (Moore I), the Court reiterated that “courts must account for” a test's error range “where an IQ score is close to, but above, 70” because “other evidence” may show that “ `[the] individual's true IQ score' ” is 70 or less. Id., at 13–15. The Court also told lower courts not to “overemphasiz[e] . . . perceived adaptive strengths” when considering whether the prisoner has “significant adaptive defcits” under the second element of the mental- retardation definition. Id., at 15–16. And it criticized the use of factors under that element that invite “lay perceptions of intellectual disability” and “lay stereotypes” to guide the analysis. Id., at 18. Then, in a second Moore v. Texas, 586 U. S.…Read in context ›
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