Hencely v. Fluor Corp. · ¶21

Without any constitutional or statutory text expressly supporting preemption, the Fourth Circuit, like the D. C. Circuit before it, resorted to our precedent in Boyle. 120 F. 4th, at 425–426; see also Saleh, 580 F. 3d, at 5. According to the Fourth Circuit, Boyle requires preemption of all claims against contractors engaged in combatant activities under the military's command authority. 120 F. 4th, at 425– 426. For its part, the Government asserts that an action is preempted if it “arises from both combatant activities and a contractor's actions within the scope of its contract.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Our precedents do not support either rule.

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