Hencely v. Fluor Corp. · ¶23
Under our precedents, Boyle explained, “a few areas, involving `uniquely federal interests,' are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law,” fashioned by federal courts in the absence of congressional action. 487 U. S., at 504 (quoting Texas In dustries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981); citation omitted); see, e. g., Clearfeld Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 366–367 (1943); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 726–729 (1979). In those rare areas of “uniquely federal interest,” the Court has held state law preempted when there is a “significant confict” between “an identifable federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,” or when “specific objectives” of federal legislation would be frustrated. Boyle, 487…Read in context ›
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