Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock · ¶20

Flowers's only real answer is to observe that these cases and others like them interpreted the Constitution's Commerce Clause, not § 1 of the FAA. Fair enough. We do not mean to suggest that the scope of § 1 is coterminous with the scope of the Commerce Clause as it was interpreted at the time of the FAA's adoption in 1925. After all, § 1 “exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transporta tion workers.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 119 (2001) (emphasis added). And the statute speaks of transportation workers “engaged in” interstate commerce, while Congress sometimes uses broader terms, like “affecting” or “involving” interstate commerce, when it wishes to regulate to the outer bounds of its authority under the Commerce Clause. Saxon, 596 U. S., at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, we can hardly blind ourselves to what this…

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