Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock · ¶22

Unable to persuade us that the FAA incorporates its crossor-tag rule, Flowers hints at other reasons why Brock might not qualify for § 1's exemption. Flowers observes, for example, that it conducts its business with Brock through a distribution agreement it has with an “independently operated compan[y]” he owns. Brief for Petitioners 9. And, indeed, some lower courts have found that relevant when assessing whether a “contract of employment” exists sufficient to trigger § 1's exemption. Compare Fli-Lo Falcon, LLC v. Ama zon.com, Inc., 97 F. 4th 1190, 1197–1198 (CA9 2024) (holding § 1 inapplicable to a contract “between two business entities”), with Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC, 162 F. 4th 354, 356–357 (CA2 2025) (holding § 1 applicable to certain agreements with “single-employee corporations”). Flowers also contends that Brock orders, purchases, and takes title to Flowers's…

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