Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · ¶25

Judge Brasher dissented. In his view, Havana Docks could establish liability based on the cruise lines' trafficking in the underlying physical property, “the docks—which still exist, are still in use, and have not expired, ended, or fallen into the sea.” Id., at 1294. And, he explained, the “majority's counterfactual analysis—asking what would have happened to Havana Docks' docks if they had not been confscated in 1960—is incompatible with the text of the Act.” Id., at 1291. Instead, the analysis Title III requires here is “very simple”: “The Cuban Government stole Havana Docks' property—its docks, piers, and other things that it had the right to operate under its concession.” Id., at 1292. “And the cruise lines have—all agree—commercially benefted by depositing paying customers on those docks and piers.” Ibid. So, “the cruise lines traffcked in confscated property to which Havana Docks…

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