Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · ¶49

On the other hand, if all that the Court of Appeals meant is that the Act requires that the defendant traffic in the same property interest that the plaintiff held, then it still misunderstood the Act. In that case, the Court of Appeals' analysis simply rested on the assumption that the relevant confscated and traffcked-in “property” must be the plaintiff's original property interest—here, the usufructuary concession. Id., at 1287–1288. But, as Judge Brasher explained, “Havana Docks' theory is that the cruise lines are using the docks”—the physical property—not that they are using the property interest. Id., at 1294. And, as we have explained, the Act allows Havana Docks to proceed on that theory. See supra, at 246–250. This understanding explains why a cruise line could have been liable under Title III for using the docks in 1997, 2001, or 2021, even though the cruise line would not…

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