Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · ¶70

The Court reaches the opposite conclusion because it believes that the “property which was confscated” in this case includes the physical docks themselves. See ante, at 11. The majority believes that not because it thinks the physical docks ever belonged to Havana Docks. On the contrary, the majority acknowledges that Havana Docks' sole “property interest was time-limited and set to expire in 2004.” Ante, at 240. But as the majority sees it, when Title III says “property which was confscated,” it means not just the property interest that was actually confscated from the plaintiff (here, the time-limited concession), but also “the physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest” (here, the physical docks). Ante, at 246, 247–248. There are three related problems with that theory of the case.

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