Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · ¶71

First, it misreads the statute Congress wrote. Congress could have imposed liability on “any person” that “traffcs in property in which a United States national held an interest which was confscated.” If so, the majority's result would follow. But that is not what Title III says. Instead, the statute imposes liability on “any person” that “traffcs in property which was confscated,” period. § 6082(a)(1)(A). So, where the only “property” confscated from the plaintiff is an intangible property interest, the defendant is liable only if he has traffcked in that interest. Trafficking in the underlying physical thing is not enough, because doing so is not trafficking in the “property which was confscated.” Of course, the majority is right that, by defning “property” to include both physical things and intangible interests, the Act “makes clear” that liability can be imposed for trafficking in…

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