Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · ¶73

Finally, the majority's approach ignores basic principles of property law. As every first-year law student learns, “property” is defined by reference not just to spatial boundaries, but also to temporal ones. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 331–332 (2002) (“An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest. . . . Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its entirety”). Yet the majority inexplicably privileges the spatial. It is obvious that a plaintiff cannot recover under Title III for trafficking in property that falls outside its own property's spatial boundaries. Suppose Havana Docks had a concession of unlimited duration, but only in the red dock—not in the…

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