Mullin v. Doe · ¶129
And even if the matter is less certain than I think, the “strong presumption” in favor of judicial review should decide it the plaintiffs’ way. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486 (2015). That presumption applies even when we interpret the scope, rather than the existence, of a judicial-review bar. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U. S. 261, 273 (2016). In that context, as in all others, we “presume that Congress intends the executive to obey its statutory commands and, accordingly, that it expects the courts to grant relief when an executive agency violates such a command.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681 (1986). The majority concedes as much, mouthing all the right words: “[W]hen a statutory provision is reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with the traditional and basic…Read in context ›
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