Mullin v. Doe · ¶62

This argument, which gives the commonly used term “determination” a special meaning, runs headlong into our statutory-interpretation precedents. We are wary of giving common terms technical meanings. See Yellen v. Confeder ated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353 (2021). Statutory interpretation proceeds on the assumption that those who draft and enact a provision generally intend its terms to mean what they mean in ordinary usage. Without that assumption, the entire endeavor would break down. Ordinary people could not understand what the law requires of them, and every word in a statute could be an unfathomable puzzle. Of course, a statute may provide expressly, or may signal in some other clear way, that it employs a common term in a way that departs from its ordinary meaning, but without strong proof of such a departure, commonly used terms should be given their common…

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