Mullin v. Doe · ¶63

Here, “determination” is a commonly used term, and therefore Doe respondents bear the burden of showing that, as used in §1254a(b)(5)(A), it carries a technical, TPS- specific meaning. But their effort to show that “statutory context” dictates adoption of their interpretation, Yellen, 594 U. S., at 351, falls short because the TPS statute uses “determination” in multiple ways that that have nothing to do with the assessment of country conditions. For example, the very first use of “determination” in the TPS statute refers to a “determination with respect to the alien’s eligibility for . . . benefits.” §1254a(a)(4)(B). In another provision, the statute refers to the “determination of an alien’s admissibility.” §1254a(c)(2)(A). Still another provision describes the effect of TPS on discretionary immigration benefits if the Secretary “determines that extreme hardship exists.” §1254a(e).…

slip opinion
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.