Chatrie v. United States · ¶142

First, unlike the data collection in Carpenter, the geofence procedure in this case did not risk uncovering the “whole of [someone’s] physical movements.” 585 U. S., at 310. In contrast to the 127 days of cell-site records in Car penter, the request made by the police here spanned just two hours.Until today, this Court had recognized a Fourth Amendment difference between tracking a person’s movements for a “brief stretch” and cataloging them for an “‘extended period of time.’” Ibid.; Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.). Although it might be difficult to “identify with precision” the dividing line between these two durations, a 2-hour stint of location tracking is “surely” too limited to constitute the “all-encompassing record” that triggered heightened privacy concerns in Carpenter. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (opinion of ALITO, J.); Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 311.

slip opinion
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.