Chatrie v. United States · ¶92

Count me unpersuaded. Why does tracking Mr. Chatrie’s movements digitally over an hour or two invade his reasonable expectation of privacy when an officer tailing him for the same length of time would not? See United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281–283 (1983). Why is Location History data Mr. Chatrie voluntarily shared with Google not “truly shared” when a person’s bank records are? See Mil ler, 425 U. S., at 440–443. Does the Court just mean to give Katz’s third party doctrine a quiet burial by suggesting today that any information shared over “smartphones” using “apps and services” falls outside its reach? Ante, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). And what does any of this have to do with the Fourth Amendment’s terms anyway? Even if Katz and its battered third party doctrine may straggle on today, they leave our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence about where the Court’s…

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