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T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation · ¶26

Under these precedents, T. M.’s case falls within “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. T. M. is complaining of injuries caused by, and is seeking relief from, the state-court judgment itself, arguing that the consent order violates her federal and state due process rights and was entered into under duress. See App. 40–45 (complaint alleging injuries stemming from the consent order). The consent order was rendered 10 days before T. M. commenced this federal lawsuit. T. M. plainly seeks “review and rejection” of the consent order by asking the District Court to “[d]eclare that the ‘Consent Order’” is “unconstitutional, unenforceable, and void ab initio” and to enjoin “enforcement of the ‘Consent Order.’” 139 F. 4th, at 347. Thus, T. M.’s case is the “‘paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding’”: She…
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