T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation · ¶32

T. M.’s theory cannot be squared with this Court’s precedents, which plainly adopted a different, more functional view of original and appellate jurisdiction than what T. M. advances here. In Rooker, for example, it was true that the judgment at issue had been affirmed by the state high court by the time the federal suit was filed, but nothing in this Court’s reasoning suggested that the outcome would have been different had the judgment still been on appeal. There (as here), Rooker’s federal suit sought to “reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment,” which the Court held would be an “exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” 263 U. S., at 416, and not a collateral attack invoking original jurisdiction. There (as here), the District Court would lack such “appellate” jurisdiction because it has “strictly original” jurisdiction. Ibid. There (as here), it would be the “province and duty of…

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