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T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation · ¶34

The dissent, for its part, admits that this Court has relied on both §§1331 and 1257 in justifying Rooker-Feldman, but contends that Exxon “buried” and “discarded” the §1331 rationale. Post, at 7–8. Had the Court in Exxon intended to bury or discard the §1331 rationale, one might have expected it to say so rather than to quote affirmatively a case that directly describes the doctrine as resting on both §§1331 and 1257. See 544 U. S., at 292 (citing Verizon Md. Inc., 535 U. S., at 644, n. 3). Moreover, Exxon acknowledged, without disapproval, Rooker’s reasoning that “[f]ederal district courts . . . lacked the requisite appellate authority, for their jurisdiction was ‘strictly original.’” 544 U. S., at 284. It also summarized Rooker and Feldman as “essentially invit[ing] federal courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” 544 U. S., at 283, and it…
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