District of Columbia v. R.W.

608 U. S. 22 (2026) · 4/20/26

Because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W., the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded.

In the wee hours of a winter morning in Washington, D. C., District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer Clifford Vanterpool received a radio dispatch call directing him to check out a suspicious vehicle at a specific address. Officer Vanterpool reached the apartment building at that address around 2:00 a.m. As he turned his marked police vehicle into the parking lot, he saw two people immediately fee from a car, “unprovoked,” after “[p]olice had not done anything other than simply pull up.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. The runners left open at least one of the car doors. The driver then…

R. W. raised a “single argument” on appeal—that Officer Vanterpool lacked reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure. In re R.W., 334 A. 3d 593, 599 (D. C. 2025). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Officer Vanterpool, by stopping R. W. without reasonable suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.