District of Columbia v. R.W. · ¶10
We need not determine whether that connection alone supported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the driver's seat and—after the passengers fed from the car—began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car's open back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising event for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run headlong away from them. But we doubt that most would respond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to drive away without at least checking whether the doors were closed. R. W.'s own actions—combined with the panicked fight of his companions—strongly suggested that he was (like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide from police. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66 (1968) (recognizing that “deliberately furtive actions and fight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia of mens rea”).Read in context ›
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