District of Columbia v. R.W. · ¶22

So I am not sure why our Court sees ft to intervene in this case, let alone to do so summarily. If the intervention refects a worry that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA) misunderstands the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, that worry seems unfounded. The DCCA has grasped the correct inquiry. Its precedents rightly observe that “[t]he issue is not whether any one factor individually justifes a stop, but rather whether `collectively' the totality of the circumstances supports a determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.” Parker v. United States, 333 A. 3d 1162, 1175 (2025) (citing Mayo v. United States, 315 A. 3d 606, 637 (2024) (en banc)); see also, e.g., Maye v. United States, 260 A. 3d 638, 647 (2021); Golden v. United States, 248 A. 3d 925, 941 (2021).

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