District of Columbia v. R.W. · ¶3

When an officer makes a “brief investigatory sto[p] of persons or vehicles that fall[s] short of [a] traditional arrest,” the Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ` “may be afoot.” ' ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989)). In assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the `totality of the circumstances' of each case”—an analysis that precludes the “evaluation and rejection” of “factors in isolation from each other.” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273–274. Because the D. C. Court of Appeals departed from these principles— and because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.—we reverse.

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