District of Columbia v. R.W. · ¶8
The question is whether the facts available to Officer Vanterpool—before he ordered R. W. to put his hands up—warranted the stop. In other words, we ask whether Officer Vanterpool had a reasonable suspicion that R. W. was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7–8. Such reasonable suspicion arises when, based on the “ `totality of the circumstances,' ” the detaining officer had a “ `particularized and objective basis' ” for suspecting criminal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable suspicion “ `depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U. S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402 (2014)). It permits officers to make “ `commonsense judgments and…Read in context ›
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