Trump v. Slaughter · ¶126

Would Congress have gone so far down this road, delegating so much legislative and judicial power to agencies, without Humphrey’s assurance that their leaders would enjoy protection against at-will presidential removal? Maybe. After all, Congress has also granted expansive authorities to various “executive” agencies whose heads have been subject to at-will presidential removal all along. But very possibly not. Humphrey’s itself described removal protections as “essential” to the FTC’s structure. 295 U. S., at 625. Ms. Slaughter cites evidence that “‘[a]t no point was it proposed that [an FTC] ought to be set up unless it be independent.’” Brief for Respondent 5 (quoting R. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 188 (1941)). Over the years, many commentators have offered similar assessments. See, e.g., Landis 111 (noting “a correlation between the creation of the independent…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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