Trump v. Slaughter · ¶136

At first blush, the most natural answer might seem Congress. Aware now that the premise on which it apparently proceeded was flawed—independent agencies are not so independent after all—Congress might wish to reconsider how much power should remain in the President’s hands. But if that seems a straightforward solution, there’s a straightforward problem with it. Of course, Congress still possesses tools—most notably its appropriations authority—to “influence how the President exercises” his legislative and judicial functions. Learning Resources v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229, 271 (2026) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). But “[a]ny President keen on his own authority . . . will have a strong incentive to veto” any effort to reclaim those powers. Id., at 270–271. The consequence is a ratchet effect: Authorities Congress once delegated by a simple majority may now require a veto-proof supermajority to…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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