Trump v. Slaughter · ¶165
Such “longstanding practice” is entitled to “ `great weight' ” in separation-of-powers cases like this one. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 862 (2020). On “doubtful question[s]” regarding the meaning of the Constitution, historical practice, when “deliberately established” through “legislative acts,” can “put at rest” the Constitution's meaning. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); see ante, at 438. That is so even for practices that “began after the founding era.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 525 (2014). As Justice Scalia explained, constitutional interpretation should refect “the principles adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than those favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.” Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 96 (1990) (dissenting opinion). Like a “more…Read in context ›
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