Trump v. Slaughter · ¶20
The Framers chose to depart from this model, for they had seen its faws up close. Common was the complaint that the States' feeble and divided executives left no “effectual check” for “the instability & encroachments” of legislatures. See 2 Farrand's Records 35 (J. Madison). For “fear” of “monarchical . . . power,” William Livingston lamented, the States “improvidently” devised executives “too weak & ineffcatious to operate with proper energy & vigour.” 5 Papers of William Livingston 56–57 (C. Prince, M. Lustig, D. Vorhees, & R. Weiss eds. 1988).Read in context ›
preliminary print (page proof)
Source edition
Passage preview. Read in context for the complete text, notes and references.