Trump v. Slaughter · ¶221
Balancing all these concerns, and the tradeoffs they entail, has historically fallen to those who know the most about them: the political branches. This Court, on the other hand, has proven itself time and again to be the least competent branch to make these judgments. Consider just one (highly salient) example: the Court’s fixation on removal. As others have explained, a “wealth of features” other than at-will removal in fact determines an agency’s responsiveness to the President. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 283 (opinion of KAGAN, J.); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 524 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The President often names the Chair. See, e.g., §41. He also, through the White House Office of Management and Budget, can “frequently” use the budget process to “ ‘influence [agencies’] policies.’” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 226; see also Brief for Bipartisan Former Chairs of the Federal…Read in context ›
slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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