Trump v. Slaughter · ¶229

Indeed, without removal protections, many of the other features of these agencies' structures risk losing their force. Bipartisan-appointment requirements can easily be evaded simply by fring all Commissioners of the opposite party. Just look at the FTC today. See supra, at 482. Lengthy fixed terms, aimed at ensuring stability, continuity, and the development of expertise within an agency, can also be cut short at the President's will. Again, look at today's FTC. Ibid. With the most extreme exercises of at-will removal, the multimember structure itself could be eliminated, by executive fat, with sufficient arbitrary frings to winnow a commission down to a sole remaining chair. Cf. Cook, 609 U. S., at 561 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (noting the “upheaval” that could result from “[e]ven temporary uncertainty” about agency independence in the wake of such frings). The very existence of…

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