Trump v. Slaughter · ¶235

The majority’s responses fail across the board. It first asserts that congressional reliance “is relevant only in the context of severability,” ante, at 24, n. 3, but this Court has been clear that “[s]tare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere, . . . ha[s] acted in reliance upon a previous decision,” Hilton, 502 U. S., at 202; see Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. None of the majority’s severability cases overruled any precedent, see ante, at 24, n. 3, and so say nothing about the role of congressional reliance in the stare decisis analysis. The majority also suggests that Congress’s reliance interests are somehow not “‘legitimate’” here because Humphrey’s recognized congressional power at the President’s expense. Ante, at 24. This assertion is perplexing. Humphrey’s endorsed Congress’s authority to create agencies “to carry into effect legislative policies…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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