Trump v. Slaughter · ¶248

The majority, for example, suggests that its rule might not apply to adjudicatory agencies, including non-Article III courts like the Tax Court. See ante, at 28. That is welcome news, but why is it so? As the majority explains, it cannot be because such agencies are exercising judicial power. Adjudications by Executive Branch agencies “are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’” Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 305, n. 4 (2013); see ante, at 19. Nor, after today, is it obvious that such agencies could safely depend on a precedent like Wiener, which did address an adjudicatory agency but rested squarely on “[t]he philosophy of Humph rey’s.” 357 U. S., at 356. Still, the majority says, a narrow exception for non-Article III adjudicators might yet survive. If that is true, questions immediately arise: What, exactly, is the…

slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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