gloss · the reading room

Trump v. Slaughter · ¶250

Perhaps most strikingly, the Court today also makes clear that, whatever the logic of its decision, there are some ad hoc historical exceptions to its totalizing view of Article II, at least for the Federal Reserve. See ante, at 27–28; Cook, 609 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–23). For most agencies, the majority here says, removal protections like the FTC’s make the President’s job “‘impossible’” and so are unlawful. Ante, at 2. For agencies that follow in the “lineage” of the First and Second Banks of the United States, however, the Court recognizes that the Founders were acutely aware “of the calamities that could arise from even the ‘suspicion’ of political manipulation of monetary policy” and that they therefore “guaranteed [such agencies] independence from Presidential control.” Cook, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22). As a result, the Court holds, removal protections remain…
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slip opinion, revised 7/07/26
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